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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JEFFREY DON IRELAND, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20021053-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
ie Je Je 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Does "consumption/' as that term is used in section 58-37-2(l)(dd)5 include the 
"physiological metabolism of the substance" in the body? 
Standard of Review. "The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law which 
[this Court] review[s] for correctness, according no deference to the [trial court's] legal 
conclusion." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, U 10, 992 P.2d 986. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann, g 58-37-2(l)(dd) (1998) 
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from 
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group 
possession or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or 
user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have 
individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if 
it is shown that the person jointly participated with one or more persons in the 
use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge that the activity 
was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a place or under 
circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over it. 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)q) (Supp. 1999) 
(2) Prohibited acts B -Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter[.] 
Utah Code Ann, g 76-l-201(l)(a) (1999) 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which 
he commits,, while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct or 
that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state; 
* * * 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the conduct 
which is any element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, 
occurs within this state. 
* * * 
(5) The judge shall determine jurisdiction. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Facts 
On November 3, 2001, defendant was the driver of a vehicle that collided with 
another vehicle resulting in the death of Angel Garcia, the driver of the other car. R. 248: 6-
7; Exh. I.1 Police requested permission to draw a blood sample, but defendant refused. R. 
248: 43-44. Police secured a search warrant and, more than five hours after the accident, 
obtained a blood sample from defendant. R. 248:24, 54. Defendant also volunteered a urine 
sample at the jail. R. 248:25-26. Testing of the blood revealed a methamphetamine level of 
.10 micrograms per milliliter and a cannabis metabolite level of 6 nanograms per milliliter. 
R. 248: 51; Exh. 3. The urinalysis confirmed the presence of both amphetamine and 
cannabis metabolites. R. 248: 51-52; Exh. 3. 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of methamphetamine, a third degree 
felony, and driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B 
misdemeanor. 1 -3. He moved to suppress the blood and urine evidence, but that motion was 
denied. R. 59-61,201-05,248. The State moved for apretrial ruling on jurisdiction, arguing 
that the presence of methamphetamine metabolites in defendant's bloodstream established 
his continued "consumption" of the drug within the State. 83-87. The trial court agreed, 
1 A copy of the Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant was admitted into evidence at 
the suppression hearing as Defendant's Exhibit 1 and is included in Addendum A. Exhibits 
introduced at the suppression hearing are found in the record in one of two manila envelopes. 
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concluding that "'consumption' includes defendant's physiological metabolism of the 
substance, which was an ongoing process." R. 206-08. 
Defendant thereafter pled guilty to both counts as charged, but reserved the right to 
appeal the trial court's decisions finding jurisdiction and denying his motion to suppress. R. 
169-76. The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero-to-five years for 
unlawful possession of methamphetamine and a concurrent jail term of 180 days for driving 
with a measurable controlled substance in the body. R. 191-96. Defendant timely appealed. 
R. 209, 226-28, 245-47. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The presence of methamphetamine in defendant's blood was sufficient to establish 
that defendant was "at least partly" using or consuming methamphetamine "within Utah." R. 
207. Section 58-37-2 defines use as "the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or 
consumption . . . of controlled substances." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd) 1998). 
Because "the application, inhalation, swallowing, [or] injection" of a controlled substance 
exhausts the list of ways that a controlled substance can be introduced into the body, 
interpreting consumption as "the initial act of introducing a controlled substance into the 
body" as urged by defendant, Aplt. Brf. at 20-21, would render that term meaningless and 
insignificant. As a result, "consumption" should be interpreted as including the 
physiological metabolism of a substance, as found by the trial court. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
"CONSUMPTION" INCLUDES THE PHYSIOLOGICAL 
METABOLISM OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY2 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1999), the State has jurisdiction to prosecute an 
offense that "is committed either wholly or partly within [Utah]." In this case, defendant 
was charged with violating Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)(Supp. 1999), which makes it 
unlawful to "knowingly and intentionally [ ] possess or use [methamphetamine]." In this 
case, the only evidence of defendant's possession or use of methamphetamine in Utah was a 
positive drug test of defendant's blood and urine. See R. 248: 51-52; Exh. 3. 
In finding jurisdiction, the trial court observed that possession or use is "broadly 
defined" to include, among other things, the "'consumption'" of a controlled substance. R. 
207 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd)(1998)). The trial court rejected defendant's 
argument that consumption is limited to the "physical act of introducing [a] controlled 
substance into your body." R. 248: 118, 121-22. Instead, the court interpreted 
"consumption" as including a "defendant's physiological metabolism of the substance, 
which [is] an ongoing process." R. 207; R. 248: 121-22. Where defendant's blood tested 
positive in Utah for methamphetamine, the court concluded that the "process [of 
consumption of the controlled substance] occurred at least partly within Utah." R. 207. The 
Because the trial court did not find jurisdiction under a theory that the presence of 
methamphetamine in defendant's blood supported an inference that he introduced 
methamphetamine into his body while in Utah, the State does not address defendant's 
argument in point A. 
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court thus determined that "the State need not prove where defendant ingested the 
methamphetamine." R. 207. 
At issue on appeal is whether "consumption," as that term is used in section 58-37-
2(l)(dd), includes the "physiological metabolism of the substance" in the body, as decided 
by the trial court, see R. 207, or is limited to "the initial act of introducing a substance into 
the body," as defendant contends on appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 20-21. A review of the law reveals 
that the trial court correctly concluded that "consumption" includes the physiological 
metabolism of the substance in the body. 
A. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
"The plain language of [a] statute provides . . . the road map to the statute's meaning, 
helping to clarify the intent and purpose behind its enactment." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 
123, ^ f 52,63 P.3d 621. This Court "presume[s] that the legislature used each term advisedly 
and give[s] effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Nelson v. 
Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, the Court reads the statutory 
language so as "'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful'" and "'avoid[s] 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'" Maestas, 
2002 UT 123, \ 52 (emphasis and first brackets supplied in Maestas) (citations omitted). As 
explained by the Utah Supreme Court, "'effect must be given, if possible, to every word, 
clause and sentence of a statute'" and "[n]o clause[,] sentence or word shall be construed as 
superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction can be found which will give force to 
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and preserve all the words of the statute.'" Id. (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2 A Sutherland 
Statutory Construction § 46:06 (4th ed. 1984)) (emphasis added). 
B. A NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF "CONSUMPTION" RENDERS IT 
SUPERFLUOUS AND MEANINGLESS 
Defendant acknowledges the foregoing rules of statutory construction. See Aplt. Brf. 
at 13. However, his proposed definition of "consumption" as "the initial act of introducing a 
substance into the body," Aplt. Brf. at 20-21, renders other portions of the section 
meaningless or superfluous and insignificant, contrary to the rules of statutory construction. 
Defendant contends that the meaning of "consumption" as "the initial act of 
introducing a substance into the body" is supported when "viewed in context with the other 
descriptive words surrounding it." Aplt. Brf. at 14. Section 58-37-2 defines "possession" or 
"use" as follows: 
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from 
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group 
possession or use of controlled substances.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1 )(dd) (1998). While "possession" is thus understood as "the 
joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, retaining, belonging, [or] maintaining 
. . . of controlled substances," "use" is understood as "the application, inhalation, 
swallowing, injection, or consumption . . . of controlled substances." Id. (emphasis added). 
The State agrees with defendant that the terms "application," "inhalation," 
"swallowing," and "injection" each "describe [an] act of introducing a substance into the 
body." Aplt. Brf. at 15; see also R. 248: 118. "Application" is the act of "placfing] in 
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contact/' as in "applying] an antiseptic to a cut," Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 105 
(1993); "inhalation" is the act of "draw[ing] in by breathing," Webster's at 1163, as in 
smoking or snorting; "swallowing" is the act of "tak[ing] in through the mouth as food," 
Webster's at 717; and "injection" is "the act . . . of injecting a drug or other substance into 
the body," Webster's at 1164. These terms, however, exhaust the list of ways in which a 
controlled substance is introduced into the body. 
If, as urged by defendant, "consumption" is interpreted as "the initial act of 
introducing a substance into the body," Aplt. Brf. at 20, it renders the surrounding terms 
"'superfluous, void or insignificant,'" or becomes so itself. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, <|[ 52 
(quoting Norman J. Singer at § 46:06). Thus, consistent with the rules of statutory 
construction, "consumption" must mean something other than thermere introduction of a 
substance into the body. 
C. "CONSUMPTION" IS UNDERSTOOD AS AN ONGOING PROCESS 
"Consumption" is, in fact, commonly understood to mean more than the mere 
introduction of a substance into a body. As observed by defendant, "consumption" is 
defined as "'a consuming or being consumed,'" Aplt. Brf. at 14 (quoting Webster's New 
World College Dictionary 313 (4th ed. 1999)) (emphasis added). "Consumption" is also 
understood as "the act or action of consuming" or "the using up . . . of something." 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 490 (1993) (emphasis added). Defendant also notes 
that "consume" is defined as "'[t]he act of destroying a thing by using it'" or "'the use of a 
thing in a way that thereby exhausts it'" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 254 (abridged 7 
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ed. 2000)) (emphases added). "Consume" is likewise understood to mean "to use up; 
expend" or "to waste or burn away." Webster's Int'l at 490 (emphases added). 
The foregoing definitions do not suggest "an act that is taking place at the moment a 
substance is being introduced into [a] body," as defendant claims. Aplt. Brf. at 14. To the 
contrary, they denote a progressive action, as "the consumption of organic matter by fire," or 
as an "iron furnace consume[s] thousands of chords for fuel." Webster's Int'l at 490 
(emphasis in original). The process of consumption only begins when a drug is introduced 
into the body. An automobile's consumption of gasoline does not end when the tank is filled 
with gas, but continues as the engine bums, "use[s] up," or "expend[s]" the fuel. See 
Webster's Int'l at 490. Likewise, the consumption or use of a controlled substance does not 
end when the substance is introduced into the body. That is only the beginning of its use. 
Consumption occurs as the body expends or metabolizes the substance. Indeed, it is only 
during this use that the user derives the effects of the drug, just as an engine consumes fuel. 
The State acknowledges that "consume" or "consumption" can refer simply to eating 
or denote the "immediate destruction" of a thing. Webster's Int'l at 490. However, as 
explained above, giving it such a meaning under the statute renders it, or the words 
surrounding it, "'superfluous, void or insignificant.'" Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^ f 52 (quoting 
Norman J. Singer at § 46:06). 
D. THE CASES CITED BY DEFENDANT ARE INAPPOSITE 
In support of his claim that "consumption" denotes only the introduction of a 
substance into the body, defendant cites to three decisions from other jurisdictions: State v. 
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Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 (Kan. 1993); State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986); and 
State v. Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. App. 1989). See Aplt. Brf. at 16-20. None of 
these cases are helpful. 
In Flinchpaugh, the Kansas Supreme Court held that "[o]nce a controlled substance is 
within a person's system, the power to control, possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at 
an end." Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 at 211. The Kansas court explained that "[t]he ability to 
control the drug is beyond human capabilities," and therefore, "[t]he essential element of 
control is absent." Id. (emphasis added). The court thus concluded that "[e]vidence of a 
controlled substance after it is assimilated in a person's blood does not establish possession 
or control of that substance." Id. (emphasis added). 
Flinchpaugh is not helpful because unlike Utah's statute, the Kansas statute does not 
prohibit the "use" of a controlled substance. Cf. State v. Sorensen, 2003 UT App 292 
(unpub. mem. dec.) (observing that section 58-37-2(l)(dd) "defining possession of controlled 
substances clearly includes 'inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption'"). The 
Kansas statute in question makes it unlawful "'to manufacture, possess, have under [ ] 
control, possess with intent to sell, sell, prescribe, administer, deliver, distribute, dispense or 
compound'" controlled substances. Id. (quoting K.S.A. 65-4127a). The statute thus focuses 
on the unlawful "possession" of drugs, an essential element of which is dominion or control. 
In Hornaday, the Washington Supreme Court relies on Flinchpaugh in likewise 
concluding that a person could not be in "possession" of any liquor once the person has 
drank the beverage. The court explained that once a person drinks the alcohol, it is "no 
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longer in [the person's] control and/or possession." Hornaday, 713 P.2d at 75 (citing 
Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 208). As explained, however, the issue here is not whether 
defendant possessed the methamphetamine, but whether he was using the methamphetamine. 
Like Utah's statute, however, the Washington statute also makes it unlawful to 
"consume" the prohibited substance. Id. at 73 (quoting RCW 66.44.270). But unlike Utah's 
statute, the Washington statute provides a definition of "consume" that specifically limits its 
meaning to the initial act of consumption, defining it as '"fat putting of liquor to any use, 
whether by drinking or otherwise.'" Id. at 76 (quoting RCW 66.04.010(6)) (emphasis 
added). Use of the verb "put" denotes the initiation of drinking. See Webster's Int'l at 1849 
(defining "put" as "to cause to perform an action" or "to set to use"). Utah's statute has not 
limited the meaning of "consumption" by so defining it. 
Finally, in Abu-Shanab, the Minnesota Court of Appeals relied on Hornaday in 
concluding that "'consume,' in the context of alcoholic beverages, means to drink, and that 
once drunk, alcohol is no longer being consumed." Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d at 559. As 
with Utah's drug statute, "consume" is not defined under Minnesota's law. However, unlike 
Utah's drug statute, the Minnesota alcohol statute does not employ other terms that would 
render meaningless and insignificant the term "consume," as narrowly defined. See Minn. 
Stat. § 340A.503 (1988) (making it unlawful for a "person under the age of 21 years to 
consume any alcoholic beverages . . . "). Accordingly, Abu-Shanab is of no relevance in 
defining consumption under Utah's drug statute. 
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Nor is this Court's decision in State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988), 
controlling or otherwise applicable. In Sorenson, "the state conceded that it could not prove 
that the offense of consumption was committed in Utah" by virtue of an odor of alcohol on 
the defendant's breath. Id. at 469. Therefore, the State treated consumption as being limited 
to the introduction of alcohol into the body by drinking. The definition of "consumption" 
was thus not at issue. Given that context, the Court held that the odor of alcohol on 
someone's breath was not sufficient, in itself, to establish that the defendant drank the 
alcohol in Utah for purposes of establishing jurisdiction. Id. at 468-70. Sorenson is also 
distinguishable in that no blood or breath test was performed to establish that alcohol was in 
fact in defendant's body and that he was thus still "consuming" it.3 
* * * 
Because "consumption" is understood as a progressive process of using up, burning, 
or expending a substance, and because narrowing its meaning to the initial introduction of a 
controlled substance into the body would render the term, or the terms surrounding it, 
meaningless and insignificant, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding of 
3
 Defendant has also claimed that interpreting "consumption" as including the 
physiological metabolism of a controlled substance "potentially gives rise to other 
constitutional concerns by making 'status' criminals of narcotics addicts who would be 
'continuously guilty of [possession or use of a controlled substance, whether or not he as 
ever used or possessed any narcotics within the State.'" Aplt. Brf at 21 (quoting Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 762-63, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 1420 (I960)). The Court should not 
address this claim because defendant did not raise it below, see R. 248: 115-22, and has not 
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. at 20-21. State v. 
Hodges, 2002 UT 117, If 5, 63 P.3d 66 (refusing to address defendant's unpreserved 
constitutional claim because defendant had asserted neither exception on appeal). 
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jurisdiction. Because this case is a "use" case, Hornaday's dissent has even greater force: 
"To hold that an admittedly intoxicated person is not in possession of intoxicants," or in this 
case, that he is not using intoxicants, "is an exercise in sophistry beyond . . . comprehension 
unless we, like spiders, are content to spin fine but temporary webs." Hornaday, 713 P.2d at 
78 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted April 15, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
iY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JEFFREY DON IRELAND, 
Defendant. 
PRETRIAL RULING ON JURISDICTION 
Case No. 021902023 FS 
Judge McCleve 
Pursuant to Utah Code §§ 76-1-201, -202, -501(3) (2002) and State and Graham v. 
Payne, 892 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1995), plaintiff State of Utah has requested a pretrial ruling on 
jurisdiction over Count I of the information, charging defendant with unlawful possession or use 
of methamphetamine, a third degree felony. 
The parties do not dispute the pertinent facts: On or about November 3-4, 2001, 
defendant was arrested in Salt Lake County, Utah., following his alleged involvement in an 
automobile accident that occurred in Salt Lake County. Pursuant to a warrant, a sample of his 
blood was collected. That blood sample, the State alleges, tested positive for a measureable 
amount of methamphetamine. Beyond defendant's presence in Utah at that time, the State has no 
certain proof of the location where defendant ingested the drug. 
i.o^ 
RULING ON JURISDICTION 
State vs Ireland 
(Ireland Junsd Ruling) PAGE 2 
In accord with the authority cited by the State, this Court finds that it has jurisdiction over 
Count I , because it was "committed either wholly or partly within the state." This is so because 
"possession or use" is broadly defined in the charging statute, to include "ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, 
injection, or consumption" of controlled substances. Utah Code § 58-37-2(l)(dd) (2002). In 
order to establish jurisdiction, the State need not prove where defendant ingested the 
methamphetamine. Instead, this Court is satisfied that "consumption" includes defendant's 
physiological metabolism of the substance, which was an ongoing process. That process 
occurred at least partly within Utah. Therefore, this Court has jurisdi^ti^^g^Qount I. 
SO ORDERED this / ' f - day of September, 2002. {f^f < ^ ^ ^ C \ ^ \ , > 
SHEILA K. Mfc 
District Court Jue 
Approved as to form: 
Attorney tor Defendai 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Pretrial Ruling on Jurisdiction was 
delivered to LISA REMAL of SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N, attorneys for 
defendant, and to KEVIN MURPHY of SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 
attorneys for plaintiff, this day of September, 2002. 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & ORDER DENYING MOT. TO SUPPRESS 
State vs. Ireland 
(Ireland Suppr FFCL) PAGE 5 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, defendant's motion to 
suppress is denied. SO ORDERED this / *r day of Sepjprffber, 20( 
SHEILA K. McCLEVE 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Attorney f^rdefendant 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order were delivered to LISA REMAL of SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N, 
attorneys for defendant, and to KEVIN MURPHY of SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S 
OFFICE, attorneys for plaintiff, this day of September, 2002. 
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BENCH, Judge: 
At a preliminary hearing, bind-over is appropriate if the 
prosecution presents evidence establishing "probable cause to 
believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it," Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h) (2); see also 
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,^16, 20 P.3d 300 (eliminating the 
distinction between the probable cause required for an arrest 
warrant and the probable cause necessary to bind over). The 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of 
the prosecution. See id. at UlO. The evidence produced at a 
preliminary hearing "need not be capable of supporting a finding 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at f15. Whether 
probable cause exists to bind over a defendant for trial is a 
question of law, reviewed on appeal "without deference to the 
court below." State v. Schrover, 2002 UT 26,^8, 44 P.3d 730. 
Although Defendant Sorensen was not in actual, physical 
possession of the paraphernalia and methamphetamine residue found 
in his house on August 8, the prosecution alleges that he 
constructively possessed both. The evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing demonstrates probable c ause to believe that 
Sorensen had "the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control" over the paraphernalia and methamphetamine residue. 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). For example, an 
officer testified that Sorensen's ex-wife stated that the bedroom 
where the contraband was found belonged to Sorensen and that "he 
had spent the [previous] night there."1 Further, Sorensen's day 
planner, social security card, and other papers bearing his name 
were found in the bedroom. When viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, with all reasonable inferences 
being drawn in its favor, the evidence establishes the requisite 
"nexus" between Sorensen and the contraband to establish probable 
cause to have him bound over for trial. Id. 
As for the charges resulting from the events of August 20, a 
positive urine analysis alone, without corroborating evidence, is 
sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Sorensen 
possessed methamphetamine and morphine.2 Cf. State v. Sorenson, 
758 P.2d 466, 468 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing decisions 
from other jurisdictions where the presence of alcohol or 
controlled substance in a person's urine did not establish 
possession beyond a reasonable doubt). Utah's statute defining 
possession of controlled substances clearly includes "inhalation, 
swallowing, injection, or consumption." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
2(1) (dd) (2002) . 
In response, Sorensen claims that he cannot be charged with 
both possession of methamphetamine and possession of 
paraphernalia because the methamphetamine charge stems from the 
presence of residue on the items the prosecution claims are 
paraphernalia. However, the items could be considered 
paraphernalia even without the residue because presence of 
residue is a factor, rather than a requirement, used in 
determining whether an item is paraphernalia. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37a-4(5) (2002). Therefore, the residue can form the basis 
for the methamphetamine charge, independent of the paraphernalia 
1. In his appellate brief, Sorensen argues that his ex-wife's 
statements should not have been considered at the preliminary 
hearing because the statements are unreliable and only reliable 
hearsay is admissible at preliminary hearings. However, Sorensen 
failed to object to the admissibility of the statements, and 
issues not raised in the court below "cannot be argued for the 
first time on appeal" unless "exceptional circumstances" exist or 
"plain error" occurred. State v. Arauelles, 2003 UT 1,1141, 63 
P.3d 731. Sorensen has argued neither "exceptional 
circumstances" nor "plain error." Id. 
2. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of 
establishing, at trial, that the presence of morphine was 
attributable to Sorensen's valid prescription for Lortab. 
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charge. Finally, Sorensen's reliance on Spanish Fork City v. 
Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, 975 P.2d 501, is misplaced because Bryan 
addressed the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rather 
than probable cause. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
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